I. Introduction
"Should you ask me to identify God or his nature, I shall cite Simonides as my authority: when the tyrant Hiero posed the same question to him, he asked for a day's grace to consider it privately, and when Hiero put the same question to him next day, he begged two days' grace. After doubling the number of days repeatedly, and being asked by Hiero why he did this, he answered: 'The longer I ponder the question, the darker I think is the prospect of a solution. '" 1 In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the quest to bring the hedge fund industry under official oversight, scrutiny, and regulation, gained substantial momentum. 2 In addition, a chain of hedge fund-related events, which allegedly contributed to the collapse of a Large Complex Financial Institution (LCFI), However, even at that time, there were concerns about hedge funds' role in financial markets and especially in the corporate governance of non-financial companies. Perceived as the legacy of the American laissez-faire capitalism, hedge funds attracted considerable animosity from politicians of continental Europe. Calling for their abolition, hedge funds were demonized as being 'crazy' and 'hellish' which "fall like a plague of locusts" over the companies, "devour everything, then fly on to the next one". buttressed the argument for government regulatory intervention in the hedge fund industry. 4 Yet, deep in the theoretical underpinnings of this interventionist approach rest several fundamental and open-ended questions. One of the overlooked aspects of hedge funds, which furtively slipped under the regulatory radar, was the definitional challenge lying at the heart of the hedge fund regulation debate.
'Private funds', 'alternative investment funds', 'hedge funds', and a panoply of more designations in different languages represent the nomenclature used to refer to a type of investment fund having idiosyncratic attributes that distinguishes it from mainstream investment funds. Although the term 'hedge fund' was coined by Carol J. Loomis in an article of 1966, which discussed the structure and investment strategies of the investment vehicle originally created in 1949 by Alfred W. Jones, 5 thus far, there is no clear understanding of the term. Indeed, questions about the definition of hedge funds can confuse even the savviest and most discerning veterans of the hedge fund industry, let alone laymen and the uninitiated.
Hedge funds have been and will continue to be a murky phenomenon, not least due to the dynamic nature of their business, the complexity of their legal structure, the vast variety of investment strategies at their disposal, and the lower levels of public disclosure required of them. The nebula surrounding the hedge fund industry, which is also partly rooted in definitional problems, poses major challenges for the regulatory strategies intended to address the before their collapse. It is generally believed that these bailouts contributed to the collapse of Bear Stearns, a systemically important financial institution. hedge funds in the spring of 2007 imposed substantial losses on the parent company, itself a systemically important investment bank. In that case, the collapse of hedge funds did not impose a substantial credit risk on Bear Stearns. However, Bear Stearns bailed them out due to reputational concerns that the failure of such entities could raise concerns about the safety and soundness of the firm itself. Such a bailout highlighted the concerns about the indirect subsidization of hedge funds by taxpayers through the parent organization's access to the Federal Reserve discount window and implicit guarantee of a bailout of a too-big-to-fail parent company. Such an opportunity for excessive risk taking means that hedge fund managers do not bear the entire costs and consequences of their risk taking, implying that regulatory measures are needed to internalize those externalities. See Dixon Lloyd, Noreen Clancy and Krishna B. Kumar, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (RAND Corporation 2012) 43 5 Carol J. Loomis, 'The Jones nobody keeps up with ' (1966) 4 Fortune Magazine problems that allegedly contributed to the global financial crisis. The most conspicuous of these challenges is regulatory arbitrage, whose basic raison d'être is to sever the link between the economic substance of an activity and its legal treatment. 6 The definitional challenges in regulating hedge funds are neither academic, ivory-tower fantasies, nor inconsequential, linguistic hair-splitting. Indeed, the relatively short history of hedge fund regulation has already witnessed cases whose outcomes were, at least partially, dependent on the definition of the term 'hedge fund'. 7 The definitional problems, which often lead to boundary problems 8 and questions of the applicability of specific rules and regulations, are so deeply ingrained in the hedge fund-regulation debate that legislators and regulators simply sweep the definitional issues under the rug to avoid having to define hedge funds. 9 Since the complexity and dynamics of financial institutions do not lend themselves to a per genus et differentiam definition, 10 the search for an all-encompassing definition that is adequately inclusive and sufficiently exclusive of each and every aspect of hedge funds seems to be a futile endeavor.
11 However precise a definition of hedge funds may be, ineluctable borderline issues will always remain. 12 Therefore, it is not surprising that a consistent pattern of avoidance -that is, a refusal to engaging in definitional issues in hedge fund regulation -can be observed among regulators. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this Article is to provide a working definition of hedge funds by which regulators can distinguish hedge funds from other similar investment funds within a principles-based regulation framework, that is, an approach to regulation that is focused on 'goals' and 'outcomes' rather than the 'means' used to achieve those goals. 13 This Article first reviews the definition of hedge funds in the two largest hedge fund-regulatory jurisdictions (i.e., the U. S. and the EU). Second, it highlights the potential problems that might arise from statutory definitions of hedge funds and argues why such definitions can be counterproductive and are likely to give rise to regulatory arbitrage. Third, this Article focuses on the publicpolicy responses to regulatory arbitrage stemming from definitional problems and proposes that, to counter regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds, any definition of hedge funds should reflect the realities of the dynamic and vibrant hedge fund industry. To achieve that objective, this Article advocates a principles-based regulatory framework, within which regulators are afforded sufficient power to designate an investment fund as a 'hedge fund' if they find that certain functional criteria are met thereby, even though the entity itself uses different self-designating labels. At the end, this Article presents a functional definition of hedge funds, based not only on their organizational structure, but also on the sui generis role they play in financial markets. The article also expands on this definition by focusing on specific functions of hedge funds and the features that mark them as special in financial market. Such a focus may well help regulators to better understand and identify the hedge fund business and eventually prevent hedge funds from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. 
The U. S. hedge fund definition
Prior to the regulatory reforms adopted in the wake of the global financial crisis, the U. S. had no statutory definition of hedge funds. 14 This regulatory lacuna gave rise to a peculiar, negative definition of hedge funds; essentially, hedge funds became the product of statutory and regulatory carve-outs that were negatively defined by reference to what they were not, rather than to what they were. 15 To be more precise, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, U. S. financial regulation purposefully 'designed out' certain entities from regulatory oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In other words, prior to the U. S.'s 2010 financial-regulatory overhaul, hedge funds were -by design -exempt from the majority of the regulations normally applicable to investment companies. 16 The regulatory failure to define hedge funds by no means suggests that there had not been attempts to provide a legal definition of hedged funds. Given the case law's constant exposure to the ever-changing world of finance, U. S. courts developed a jurisprudential definition of hedge funds. In Goldstein v. SEC., the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
'Hedge funds' are notoriously difficult to define. The term appears nowhere in the federal securities laws, and even industry participants do not agree upon a single definition. The term is commonly used as a catch-all for 'any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public'.
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As even those with very little exposure to, or experience with, the hedge fund industry can see, the court's definition is far from satisfactory. The following subsections present an overview of the U. S.'s regulatory attempt to define hedge funds, both before and after the Dodd-Frank Act, including an overview of the above mentioned Acts, to help clarify the U. S.'s definition of hedge funds.
i. The Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates publicly owned companies that invest in securities (i.e., investment companies), in contrast to industrial companies that engage in manufacturing goods or providing services. This Act mostly regulates mutual funds and their managers, directors, and advisers. As with other regulations in financial markets, this Act first requires investment companies to register with the SEC. Further, it imposes certain requirements on their capital structure and their transactions with insiders and institutes Normally, because hedge funds are investment companies as defined by the Investment Company Act, 18 they would fall under the Act's ambit. Nevertheless, the Act establishes two exemptions from its provisions. First, section 3 (c)(1) of the Investment Company Act exempts investment companies that have no more than one hundred investors; and second, section 3(c)(7) of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) exempts such investment companies composed of an unlimited number of qualified purchasers. Provided that an investment company complies with the requirements of either of the two exemptions, they are relieved of the obligation to register with the SEC. Section 3(c)(1) 19 provides that "any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities" is not deemed to be an 'investment company'.
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In other words, a fund or an issuer having fewer than one hundred investors that raises capital through private placement is not considered an investment company for the purposes of the Investment Company Act and, accordingly, is exempt from the registration requirement.
In a 1996 no-action letter, 21 the SEC agreed that "each Fund may be considered a single beneficial owner of a 3(c)(1) Entity, provided that:
18 According to the Investment Company Act an 'investment company' means "any issuer which-(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding; or (C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis." 15 U. S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1). 19 15 U. S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). 20 15 U. S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A). 21 Facing uncertainty with respect to whether a particular product, service, or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law, an individual or entity may request a 'no-action' letter from the SEC staff. A no-action letter is the SEC's staff position letter stating that if certain conditions are met, the staff will recommend no enforcement action be taken by the SEC against the requester based on the representations in the request. The no action letters only represent the opinion of the SEC's staff and not those of the 1. no Fund will invest in any 3(c)(1) Entity to the extent that the attribution provisions of section 3(c)(1)(A) are triggered; and 2. no Fund or 3(c)(1) Entity will be structured or operated for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of the Act."
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Therefore, in accordance with the above-cited provisions and the SEC's noaction letter, beneficial ownership by a 'company' was considered to be beneficial ownership of one person, such that section 3(c)(1) issuers could have fewer than one hundred funds as their investors, provided that the ownership of the shares by any one of those companies or persons does not exceed 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer.
In a 1994 no-action letter, 23 the SEC announced that if the employee participants of a defined-contribution plan involved in investment decision making, that plan could not be counted as a single investor. Therefore, if participants in such a contribution plan have an active role in the management of the plan, each participant would be counted towards the 100-investor limit.
Later, on October 11, 1996, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) became law. That Act amended, inter alia, the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Its significance lies in its amendments, which are of particular relevance to hedge funds and their ability to raise funds from an unlimited number of qualified purchasers. Section 3(c)(7) of the NSMIA (codified as section 3(c)(7) of the 1934 Act, as amended) states that hedge funds can offer their securities to an unlimited number of 'qualified purchasers'. 24 In other words, this Act created new categories of hedge funds that could be sold to an unlimited number of 'qualified purchasers'. Nonetheless, section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 25 continued to set a limit on the number of hedge funds' qualified investors. According to that Act, if a fund has 500 or more investors, qualified or not, the registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act apply. Thus, to be exempt from Securities Exchange Act regulations, hedge funds needed to limit the number of their investors to 499. 26 Pursuant to the enactment of the NSMIA, two types of hedge funds emerged, 'Section 3(c)(1) funds' and 'Section 3(c)(7) funds'. Basically, subject to certain requirements, the NSMIA allowed funds that relied on the definitional exception of the Investment Company Act section 3(c)(1) ('Section 3(c)(1) funds') (i. e., privately held investment companies with 100 or fewer beneficial owners), to convert into 'Section 3(c)(7) funds' (i.e., privately held investment companies owned solely by qualified purchasers). As long as a hedge fund falls within either of these two exemptions, it will not be considered an investment company for the purposes of the Investment Company Act and its strict provisions would not apply.
ii. Investment Advisers Act of 1940
According to the Investment Advisers Act, 27 an 'investment adviser' means "any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities". 28 The Act requires registration with the SEC and establishes disclosure obligations, restrictions on fee arrangement structures and other obligations with regard to maintaining books and records for those advisers falling under its regulatory purview.
Hedge fund advisers clearly fall within that definition, which implies that they should be obliged to register with the SEC and comply with its regulations. Nevertheless, hedge funds could avoid that obligation by taking advantage of the Act's section 203(b) de minimis exception. Section 203(b)(3) 29 of the Investment Advisers Act states that an investment adviser having fewer than 15 clients during the course of preceding 12 months, "who neither holds himself out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company" need not register with the SEC. 30 Moreover, a hedge fund adviser can take advantage of the Investment Advisers Act's safe harbor, which provides that a legal entity, such as a hedge fund, is to be counted as a single client. Therefore, if a hedge fund adviser advises fewer than fifteen individual funds over the course of a rolling twelve-month period, that adviser would have been be exempt from registration. Accordingly, the de minimis exception and the SEC's interpretation of the word 'client,' which included legal entities such as hedge funds, each hedge fund adviser could have 14 funds as clients. It is worth remembering that each of those hedge fund clients, in turn, could have up to 499 individual investors.
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In 2004, the SEC, concerned about hedge fund secrecy and fraudulent practices, as well the need to rein in hedge fund advisers and protect unsophisticated investors who had indirectly invested in hedge funds through pension funds and other financial institutions, issued a new rule (commonly known as 'the Hedge Fund Rule'). 32 Basically, in this rule making, the SEC announced that the term 'client' includes 'investors', and in the assessment of the number of clients an adviser had, all investors in the investing fund, including individual investors, must be counted. Thus, for the next two years, the SEC required hedge fund investment advisers with more than 15 clients (regardless of whether they were individuals or legal entities) to register with it under the Investment Company Act. 
iii. Securities Act of 1933
Financial services and products, particularly securities, are deemed to be credence goods. 36 The information asymmetry in credence goods is wider than all other types of information-sensitive goods and services. Historically, information sensitivity and the existence of such a huge information asymmetry between issuers and investors have frequently caused market failures in securities markets and, hence, frequent disruptions in market liquidity. In response to market disruptions and with a view toward minimizing asymmetric information between issuers and investors in publicly traded companies in primary market transactions, the US enacted the Securities Act of 1933, which imposes registration and disclosure obligations on the issuers of regulated securities. The Act's main objective is to ensure informed investment decisions by investors, by requiring issuers to disclose all relevant information concerning the value of the securities to be issued, thereby preventing fraud in the primary markets.
Since interests in hedge funds are deemed 'securities' for purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 37 as interpreted by the courts, including the definition and meaning of a 'security' (i.e., the Howey test), 38 no public solicitation of such securities is allowed unless the issuer is registered with the SEC and complies with all of the 1933 Act's reporting and other requirements. Hedge funds, like any other investment fund, might fall within the scope of the 36 In economic theory, with respect to informational imperfections, product and services are categorized into three broad groups. 'Search goods', the quality of which can be inspected upon purchase; 'Experience goods' the quality of which can only be assessed after the purchase and the use of those goods (or services); and 'Credence goods' the quality of which cannot be assessed even after purchase and use, or whose quality might not be assessable at all. Securities Act of 1933 if they offer investment opportunities to investors in an initial offering, unless they qualify for one of the exemptions set out in the Act.
The 1933 Act furnished a private-offering exemption in its section 4(2). 39 If an issuer met the requirements of a private offering, it did not need to comply with the requirements of the Act with regard to information disclosure. Alternatively, an issuer could rely on the safe harbor provided by Rule 506 of Regulation D. 40 This rule allowed securities to be privately offered "to a maximum of 35 sophisticated purchasers and an unlimited number of 'accredited investors' as defined by Rule 501(a) of the 1933 Act." 41 
iv. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, regulates secondary market transactions and all institutions participating in such transactions, including market professionals and institutions. This Act was intended to enhance the efficiency of trading through national securities markets. It also protects investors primarily through disclosure obligations. It requires, inter alia, brokers, national securities exchanges, and municipal securities dealers to register with the SEC and comply with its extensive regulations. It further requires continuous disclosure through periodic reporting requirements (i.e., quarterly and annual reporting by publicly traded companies) commonly known as 'Exchange Act reporting issuers'. This Act only regulates post-distribution or secondary market trading such as tender offers, insider trading, and proxy solicitations. Registered investment funds under this Act are subject to:
1. Periodic disclosure requirements under § 13 42 and § 13(d), § 13(g), and § 13(f); 2. Proxy rules under § 14; In addition to the above-mentioned requirements, this Act imposes the most important and the most inclusive anti-fraud liability under its § 10(b), which is supported by the SEC's well-known Rule 10b-5. The Securities Exchange Act also contains anti-manipulation provisions and rules regulating proxy solicitation and certain relevant disclosures.
The Securities Exchange Act generally applies to brokers and dealers and since most hedge funds were considered traders rather than dealers, 45 this Act's section 15b registration requirement did not apply to them. However, if a hedge fund took on dealer functions, 46 it should have been registered under this Act. 47 Since most hedge funds do not issue securities to be listed on a securities exchange, they do not fall under the scope of the Securities Exchange Act and within its definition of 'dealer in securities'.
In addition, section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act required an issuer having 500 or more total investors and assets in excess of one million dollars to register with the SEC. However, hedge funds limited the number of their total investors to 499, thereby avoiding such registration and reporting requirements. Nevertheless, the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act ( § 10b) 48 and SEC's Rule 10b-5 apply to all investment companies regardless of whether or not it is registered.
v. Dodd-Frank Act and elimination of the private adviser exemption
Section 402 of the Private Fund Act, characterizes hedge funds as 'private funds' under the Investment Advisers Act, which regulates investment advisers who advise and manage investment funds in the U. S. In addition to imposing registration and reporting requirements, the Act imposes substantive regulatory requirements on investment advisers. Under the previous regime, which was repealed by the Private Fund Act, the Investment Advisers Act excluded certain investment advisers from the application of its requirements; 49 Under that regime, hedge fund advisers were exempt from registration as long as they advised no more than 15 clients ('the Private Adviser Exemption'). Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act, which was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, no longer exempts advisers with such qualifications.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines a 'private fund' to be an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in its section 3 of the Investment Company Act 50 unless the issuer could avail itself of an exemption under sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) thereof. Section 3(c)(1) is only available to a fund that does not publicly offer its securities and has no more than 100 beneficial owners of its outstanding securities, while section 3(c)(7) is only available to a fund that does not publicly offer its securities and limits its owners to qualified purchasers.
The Private Fund Act only requires managers acting solely as an adviser to private funds with $150 million or more in assets under management (AUM) 51 to register with the SEC.
52 Therefore, for the managers whose AUM exceeds the $150 million threshold, For those managers, the Act abolishes the private investment adviser exemption found in the Investment Advisers Act as interpreted by the Goldstein v. SEC decision. 53 An adviser, who is not registered with the SEC, is required, however, to register with the State in which it has the principal office if the State's law so requires. In short, under the new rules, unless private fund advisers have at least $150 million in AUM, they are not required to register with and report to the SEC. 54 The Volcker Rule uses the Private Fund Act's definition of a hedge fund. Under the Volcker Rule, a hedge fund or private equity fund is an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, 55 but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or such similar funds as the appropriate federal banking agencies, the SEC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) may determine.
56 Therefore, hedge funds and private equity funds are defined to include any issuer that relies on the exemptions of the definition of investment company under sections 3(c)(1) or 49 However, it is maintained that these exclusions do not mean that antifraud liability and certain other provisions do not apply to hedge funds. 50 15 U. S.C. 80a-3. 51 The total market value of the assets managed by an investment company on behalf of its investor is called AUM. 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. 57 According to the Investment Company Act "an issuer that is not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities and either (i) has outstanding securities that are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons or (ii) has outstanding securities that are owned exclusively by qualified purchasers" is excluded from the definition of 'investment company'. 58 The definitional exclusions set out in the Investment Company Act, as amended, are used by hedge funds and a large number and variety of other legal entities. These other entities include special purpose acquisition vehicles, certain ERISA-qualified employee pension funds, controlled subsidiaries, and certain joint ventures and, perhaps, venture capital funds. 59 Thus, the question once again arises; what is a hedge fund and how should they be distinguished from these entities?
There are major problems with the definitions of a hedge fund and private equity fund set out in the Investment Company Act, as amended by the Private Fund Act, and the Volcker Rule. The first and foremost is that these definitions are both over-and under-inclusive: the Volcker Rule's prohibitions might include funds that were not intended to be regulated thereunder. In other words, not all investment funds traditionally considered to be hedge funds or private equity funds rely on the exemptions of sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. While it is possible to create an investment fund that relies on other exemptions provided by the Investment Company Act and do not literally fall under the definition of a hedge fund or private equity fund, such funds may pursue exactly the same strategies used by hedge funds and private equity funds, and those funds might not be captured by the Volcker Rule's definitions. For example, commodity pools that do not mainly invest in financial instruments can fall into this category of funds.
The definition's under-inclusiveness is partly addressed by the congressional grant of authority to regulators to bring 'similar funds' within the scope of the Volcker Rule.
60 To determine which funds should be included in the category of 'similar funds', regulators should analyze the investment activities and other features of such funds, including their compensation structure, trading and investment strategy, use of leverage, and investor composition.
61 Indeed, the Investment Company Act's statutory exemptions were not intended to exclusively apply to hedge funds and private equity funds. Thus, the criteria for delineating the exceptions the Volcker Rule intends to grant for certain funds remain to be determined by future rule making.
The potential challenge to these definitions is that they provide excellent opportunities for legal engineering to circumvent them -that is, they are ripe for regulatory arbitrage. 62 Likewise, hedge fund regulation, which relies on definitions with an appeal to the literal meaning of words through adjudication and judicial interpretation, can be used to undermine the very purpose of the regulation: to address the potential risks originating from the hedge fund industry. The section demonstrates that hedge fund regulation in the EU is not significantly different from that in U. S.; it is also over-and under-inclusive and susceptible to regulatory arbitrage.
III. The Definition of Hedge Funds in the EU
The EU's Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) 63 classifies hedge funds, along with several other funds, as 'Alternative Investment Funds' (AIFs). The AIFMD generally defines an AIF as any collective investment scheme that is not already covered by the regulatory regime established pursuant to the EU's Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITSs) Directive (Directive 2009/65/EC (as amended by the Directive 2014/91/EU). More specifically, under the AIFMD, an AIF is any collective investment undertaking that raises capital from a number of investors with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors and that does not otherwise require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of the UCITS Directive, as amended.
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As regulatory definitions are the most likely provisions used in regulatory arbitrage (e.g., purposely arranging the fund structure to avoid falling within the definition), the AIFMD attempts to address, at least in part, the issue in its from an AIF is its source of capital: UCITSs raise capital from the public, whereas AIFs raise their capital privately. 70 Access to AIFs is, therefore, often restricted to professional investors. 71 Despite the AIFMD's sweeping, and seemingly over-inclusive, regulation, it explicitly excludes: holding companies; institutions for occupational retirement provision, which are already covered by the EU Directive on the Activities and Supervision of Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision; supranational institutions; 72 national central banks; national, regional, and local governments; bodies or institutions managing funds that support social security and pension systems; employee participation or employee savings schemes; and securitization special purpose entities. 73 It seems that the AIFMD's attempt to mitigate the risks of regulatory arbitrage compromises the exclusiveness criterion of its definitions; by trying not to expose its provisions to regulatory arbitrage, the EU opted for broad and over-inclusive definitions. Not surprisingly, even before its implementation, the industry and many commentators criticized the AIFMD's overbroad definition of an AIF. 74 For example, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether certain legal entities and structures fall within the its scope. Such concerns are particularly pronounced regarding products such as covered bonds, acquisition vehicles, managed accounts, and index-linked or performance notes.
75
A second criticism of the sweeping definitions contained in the AIFMD, is that it captures a broad array of dissimilar funds with highly heterogeneous investment strategies and indiscriminately regulates them as if they were identical. Indeed, one of the significant recurring concerns raised throughout the Although the European Parliament ostensibly believed that the AIFMD would cover all small funds, it proposed a differentiated approach to regulating the industry, based on the types of funds rather than a uniform-but-sweeping one-size-fits-all regulatory approach. 78 Nevertheless, despite the fact that some of the AIFMD's provisions attempt to differentiate between large hedge funds and smaller ones and to draw a line between hedge funds, on the one hand, and private equity funds, particularly venture capital firms, on the other, the provisions ultimately adopted generally fail to differentiate between different types of hedge funds based on their investment strategies. 79 For example, certain regulatory issues are more relevant to hedge funds and less relevant to private equity funds. To be more specific, maturity transformation, which may be relevant to the hedge fund industry, is not relevant to private equity funds, 80 which implies that liquidity requirements for hedge funds should be different from those for private equity funds. 81 Moreover, concerns about leverage in hedge funds and private equity funds are different: hedge fund leverage occurs at the fund level, both directly and indirectly, through off-balance sheet exposure (e.g., investment in derivatives), while private equity fund leverage often occurs at the portfolio company level. 82 is imperative that adequate attention be paid to the heterogeneity of funds, particularly hedge funds, because of their differences from similar investment companies and the need for differentiation in regulating such heterogeneous entities.
In light of the above discussion, it seems that the AIFMD's attempt to uniformly regulate AIFs and capture all possible contingencies largely overlooks significant differences between AIFs, strategies, and instruments, all of which require differentiated regulatory treatment. In other words, the AIFMD's strategy for preventing regulatory arbitrage and circumvention of its provisions went too far. Most hedge fund managers believe that the AIFMD's onesize-fits-all regulatory approach is highly inappropriate and, for at least some hedge funds, its regulations "simply do not make sense."
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With regard to systemic-stability issues, the differentiation between differentbut-seemingly similar funds is of special significance. Regulators must devise benchmarks to differentiate and separate systemically important hedge funds from other funds that do not pose systemic threats to the financial system. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act, mentioned above, contains rules for identifying and regulating the potential systemic risk of private funds (including hedge funds) by assigning responsibility for designating entities as Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies (SINBFCs) to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The Dodd-Frank Act grants authority to the FSOC to determine whether a non-bank financial company (which includes, among others, hedge funds) is to be supervised by the Federal Reserve (the Fed) and be subject to prudential standards. If the FSOC determines that "material financial distress at the U. S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U. S. nonbank financial company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States", it will subject the company to the Fed's prudential supervision. 84 Furthermore, the FSOC has been given the discretion ities, while private equity funds often invest in equities. In addition, the risk of counterparty is less in private equity compared to hedge funds. It is also argued that hedge funds' trading strategies are highly correlated while the heterogeneity of assets in private equity implies that it is unlikely that the fire sale externalities might occur due to strategy correlations. The only systemic risk related issue that can occur in private equity funds rises from the input of bank debt into the portfolio company, however, the AIFMD does not seem to be addressing such an issue. See Payne, 'Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe' Nevertheless, except under very limited circumstances, the AIFMD almost invariably treats these institutions as if they are identical in every aspect. 1) to recommend to the Fed that it strengthen the prudential standards for a particular SINBFC. 85 In the EU, however, although the AIFMD introduces lower benchmarks to exclude smaller AIFMs from its regulatory requirements, when compared with the Dodd-Frank Act, the criteria for designating individual hedge funds as systemically important AIFs are blatantly absent.
The EU-and the U. S.-regulatory approaches to tackling regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds are ill-suited for such a purpose. The remainder of this Article argues that, although all attempts to forestall regulatory arbitrage are flawed, the least-flawed method for tackling regulatory arbitrage is neither offering a negative definition nor a restrictive or over-inclusive definition; rather, the least-flawed method involves opting for a different regulatory strategy: principles-based regulation. After examining that regulatory strategy, the Article contends that the U. S. regulatory strategy, which affords regulators discretion to identify hedge funds, can be more effective in the fight against regulatory arbitrage arising from definitional problems. But, before offering regulatory strategies to fight definitional problems, the following section explains how hedge funds might take advantage of definitional problems to circumvent regulations and game regulatory regimes.
IV. Definitional Problems and Regulatory Arbitrage
One of the main sources of legal engineering and regulatory arbitrage is definitional problems in the regulation itself. 86 arbitrage opportunities that arise from definitional problems. In the European Union the dynamism of regulatory competition, which can create ample opportunities for regulatory arbitrage in company law, is slightly different from that of the U. S. This is because the theory adopted in major EU jurisdictions regarding the determination of applicable laws to companies differs from the theory adopted in the U. S. There are two main contrasting theories regarding the applicable law to companies; the incorporation theory and the real seat theory. According to the incorporation theory, the laws of the jurisdiction in which the company is incorporated govern that company. In this view, the location of the business operations of the company does not matter. The incorporation theory is mainly adopted in the U. S. and allows for vast regulatory competition and regulatory arbitrage opportunities. In contrast, under the real seat theory, the company is subject to the laws and regulations of the jurisdiction in which its main business activities are being undertaken (or where the headquarter of a firm is located). This theory is dominant in the EU. Although most European countries opted for the real seat theory, the EU Treaty and recent judicial tially "exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment". 88 Such exploitation is made possible due to a "legal system's intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision". 89 Thus, definitional problems cause regulatory complications and attempts to define hedge funds for regulatory purposes are no exception. For years, initiatives to tighten hedge fund regulation have been thwarted by an inability to define them properly.
In addition to the inherent indeterminacy in language, 90 the prospective generalizations that are a necessary feature of law 91 are yet another source of indeterminacy and vagueness in statutory definitions and subsequent interpretations. Regardless of how precise and determinate a particular rule is, the limits of human foresight implies that even the most definitive terms may become vague when applied to a situation that was not already contemplated when the rule was adopted: 92 in that case, "a rule ... is only as good as its interpretation."
93 Thus, the choice of a particular method of interpretation in financial regulation, enforcement, and adjudication can significantly affect the number and severity of problems arising from the boundaries set by statutory definitions in financial markets.
Limited linguistic ability, coupled with interpretation issues, breed opportunities in which technical compliance with the applicable rules and regulations can be achieved while undermining the underlying justifications on which the entire regulatory system or a specific law is predicated. Compliance of this sort, dubbed 'creative compliance', essentially involves "using the law to 94 and is a welldocumented phenomenon. 95 Aside from the intrinsic limited ability of legal systems to capture the substance and the economics of transactions, another source of regulatory arbitrage is associated with 'legal formalism'. Legal formalism -that is, denying the "necessity of choice in penumbral areas of rules" 96 -follows the letter of a rule, even if it fails to serve its purpose. 97 The emphasis on literal interpretation and legal formalism underscore the important role of definitions in legislation, rule-making, and adjudication. Needless to say, contrary to principles-based regulation, the focus of which is the 'goals' rather than the 'means' of achieving those goals, rules-based regulation creates vast opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
98 Likewise, rules-based hedge fund regulation, along with the appeal to the literal meaning of words in adjudication and legal interpretation, can be used to undermine the very purpose of regulation designed to address the externalities of hedge funds. Accordingly, the need for interpretation implies that the regulators' reliance on definitions is not necessarily helpful. On the contrary, it can be counterproductive. This impasse was the crux of the U. fund as an entity. 101 The hassles associated with defining dynamic and heterogeneous entities, such as hedge funds, give rise to problems that make their regulation difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Indeed, the potential for regulatory arbitrage deters most regulatory attempts to define hedge funds and is a gigantic obstacle for rules-based regulation. These problems can better be addressed by using principles-based regulation.
V. A Policy Response to Regulatory Arbitrage
The massive potential for hedge funds to practice regulatory arbitrage originates from rules-based regulation and its inherent definitional problems. The alternative -principles-based regulation -is far better suited to combatting regulatory arbitrage. Principles-based regulation is, essentially, based on the standards-vs.-rules dichotomy in legal parlance. 102 A beneficial aspect of 'standards' (as opposed to 'rules') is their flexibility; it allows regulated entities to choose the specific means of achieving the general standards and goals set by regulators, especially when regulation involves target and performance (or output) standards. 103 Therefore, "in those areas of the law in which economic and social conditions change frequently and with them the optimal set of legal decisions, standards are more efficient than rules." 104 101 Since the problem of definition is ubiquitous in regulation of economic activities and is not limited to the institution-based financial regulation, entity-based approach to regulation or institutional regulation has its own proponents. In other words, definitional problems also pose almost the same challenges to the 'product-based approach' to regulation. Gibson shows how regulation of swap agreements could escape regulation because there is uncertainty and complexities in defining financial products such as securities and futures. She concludes that concerning swap markets, the regulatory problems such as definitional and jurisdictional problems can best be addressed by focusing on the 'market participant-based regulation' rather than the classification of In the FSA's view, principles-based regulation meant "moving away from dictating through detailed, prescriptive rules and supervisory actions how firms should operate their business." 113 This regulatory strategy suggested "greater reliance on principles and outcome-focused, high level rules", and less reliance on prescriptive rules, to achieve certain regulatory outcomes. On this basis, the FSA emphasized the enhancement of a risk-and evidence-based approach to financial regulation with an eye toward outcomes.
114
There were, of course, costs and benefits to the FSA's approach. Firms benefitted from the flexibility of principles-based regulation and the role it may play in facilitating innovation and enhanced competition; the regulators benefitted from a flexible, facilitative role in innovation in regulatory methods and types of supervision, as well as enhanced regulatory competition. The FSA's approach likely resulted in durable regulation even in a fast-changing financial environment. All in all, it appears that all stakeholders benefitted from the purportedly improved conduct of firms focused more on substantive compliance than 'creative compliance'.
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In addition to the flexibility offered by principles-based regulation with regard to variations in details and implementation to achieve a particular goal and the opportunities that flexibility affords to achieving better regulatory international harmonization and decentralization, principles-based regulation contains a hidden aspect -that is, it can overcome legal engineering that tries to comply with the words of law while escaping its reach and undermining its spirit. Indeed, "principles-based regulation is seen as the only realistic response, the only way to try to capture the spirit of the law in the face of constant creativity and technical challenge."
116 The need to deal with legal and financial engineering to escape the spirit of law was the driving force behind the adoption of principles-based regulation by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the 1990s, "which saw it as an essential bastion against opportunistic legal engineering". Notwithstanding the benefits associated with the FSA's approach, principlesbased regulation came under criticism during the global financial crisis. Even the FSA called the approach a failure, partly because "a principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no principles".
118 However, after the financial crisis, scholars suggested the FSA and its successors not to abandon that regulatory approach merely because of crisis-driven criticism. 119 These scholars warn that reverting to a rules-based approach will likely result in even more legal engineering. This result is highly plausible because, "creative compliance thrives on rule-based regulation, for tight specific rules provide particularly solid material for legal engineers to work with."
120 Adherents of principles-based regulation steadfastly continue to call for a renewed commitment to it, as long as it is coupled with a meaningful enforcement and oversight.
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Principles-based regulation can be more effective in preventing regulatory arbitrage than rules-based regulation. A principles-based regulator needs to rely on a functional definition rather than a black-letter-law definition of a hedge fun, as the latter is prone to regulatory arbitrage. As demonstrated earlier, neither statutory nor case-law 'black-letter' definitions of hedge funds truly capture the nature and activities of the hedge fund industry; moreover, confining the scope of the definition of hedge funds to a negative definition tells nothing about the hedge fund industry itself. With principles-based regulation of hedge funds, the identification of real-world hedge funds by regulators and supervisors needs to be founded on a functional approach to the definition of hedge funds rather than a negative statutory definition. Since the current regulatory definitions of hedge funds do not reflect the true nature of the industry and its attributes, the following section of this Article defines hedge funds not by reference to what they are not, but by reference to what they are, what they do, and their 'specialness' in the grand scheme of financial markets and institutions. 
VI. What is a Hedge Fund? An Alternative Definition
Hedge funds, as one of many financial-market participants, play several roles with respect to intermediation, risk management, and allocation of funds. Despite their status as late-comer investment firms, they are at the forefront of the investment industry. Interestingly, hedge funds, like other mainstream investment companies, are collective investment vehicles that manage pools of securities on behalf of their investors; from a functional standpoint, hedge funds can hardly be distinguished from traditional investment companies.
From an etymological perspective, a 'hedge' is a mechanism designed to reduce risk. Although the first hedge fund was designed for hedging purposes, 122 the reality of hedge funds is far removed from its etymological roots. In other words, the term 'hedge fund' does not necessarily imply that a particular fund is 'hedged' and, therefore, has limited exposure to underlying market risks. Indeed, it is hard to find a greater misnomer than the term 'hedge fund', because hedge funds more often speculate than hedge.
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To better understand hedge funds, they must be viewed in light of their similarities with, and differences from, other financial institutions. In general, when compared to other mainstream financial institutions, hedge funds are more lightly regulated. Indeed, the first, and perhaps most significant, distinguishing characteristic of hedge funds, which contributes to their relative success, is the lack of legal and regulatory restraints on their investment strategies. Therefore, lighter regulatory treatment of hedge funds is one of their most significant distinctive features. The implications of this differentiated regulatory treatment are that they cannot sell their shares to the general public, and their pool of investors must be limited to certain institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs). In addition, since hedge funds' investment strategies and their concentration and liquidity policies are not restricted, they can engage in aggressive investment strategies to exploit certain shortterm investment opportunities.
The second-most conspicuous difference is the hedge funds' organizational form and legal structure. Mutual funds, for example, generally use simple onshore organizational forms, whereas hedge funds often establish complex onshore and offshore structures. 124 A second unique feature is that hedge funds are typically organized in the form of either limited liability partnerships (LLPs) or limited liability companies (LLCs). Such legal structures, which are The hedge fund industry's fee structure is a third idiosyncratic feature: it is unique in that, beyond the usual management fee that is charged on the overall investment in the fund, hedge funds often charge additional 'performance' or 'incentive' fees. While the amount of these fees differs, most hedge funds follow the '2 to 20 rule': they charge two percent of the investment in the fund as their standard management fee plus an incentive or performance fee equal to twenty percent of the funds' profits.
A fourth distinctive hedge fund feature is that they often limit their investors' redemption rights and, hence, investment in hedge funds is considered to be rather illiquid when compared to the liquidity that banks and mutual funds offer to their depositors and investors. Moreover, hedge funds can limit investor redemptions in unconventional ways by using gates and side-pocket arrangements 125 that are thought to be essential for liquidity management.
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Nevertheless, investments in hedge funds are often more liquid than investment in other AIFs, such as private equity and venture capital funds.
Searching for a definition that includes all aspects of hedge funds, while simultaneously excluding other financial institutions seems to be a futile endeavor; there is always a need for, at the very least, a working definition to pass through the definitional quagmire and take further steps in studying them.
A working 'functional' definition of a hedge fund is: a privately organized 127 125 To prevent a run on hedge funds, hedge fund managers usually use a gate or a gate provision. Gate provisions are restrictions on hedge fund investors intended to limit the amount of withdrawals from the fund during a redemption period. Side pocket arrangements are referred to mechanisms to segregate parts of a hedge fund's assets to be invested in illiquid and hard to value projects or investments. The assets allocated to the side pockets cannot be redeemed unless the returns on the projects or investments are realized or they become liquid marketable securities again. 126 The above-mentioned parameters created a comparative advantage for hedge funds in comparison to the mainstream financial institutions. These features of hedge funds are the result of a labyrinth of regulatory and fundamental economic processes. That regulatory structure which gave rise to the hedge funds will be studied in detail in the fourth chapter, which deals with the hedge funds regulation in the U. S. prior to the financial regulatory reforms. 127 Hedge funds are mainly structured in the form of a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) or a Limited Liability Company (LLC).
investment vehicle with a specific fee structure, 128 that is not widely available to the public, 129 is aimed at generating absolute returns irrespective of market movements (alpha) 130 through active trading, 131 and makes use of a variety of trading strategies. Although this working 'functional' definition is not particularly helpful in identifying real-world hedge funds, the following description of the industry provides a better picture of hedge funds and unravels some of the myths associated with the hedge fund industry.
VII. Are Hedge Funds Special?
The working 'functional' definition presented above must be expanded and clarified because it is important to understand why hedge funds are special, what makes them different, and what they contribute to financial systems that other financial institutions do not. In other words, a true functional definition of hedge funds requires isolating hedge funds' idiosyncratic functions that, if hedge funds' did not exist, would, to a large extent, not be performed. For example, by law, taking deposits and granting loans are special functions performed by credit institutions and, in the absence of any authorized credit institutions, such functions would not be performed. Similarly, hedge funds perform a specific array of functions, which make them special among financial-market participants.
128 A typical hedge fund charges 2% of the net asset value under management as management fee and 20% of the profits as performance or incentive fee (certain high-water marks and hurdle rates may apply). 129 In the U. S., the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) directs the SEC to amend the rule 506 of regulation D to remove the ban on hedge fund general solicitation. However, the sale of hedge fund products is still restricted to the accredited investors. movements. 138 For example, allocating 10 to 20 percent of portfolio to alternative investments, which include hedge funds, is recommended as an ideal allocation of investments for pension funds that strive for a long-term low risk/low return investment strategy. 139 Moreover, hedge funds are also sources of liquidity. 140 Their liquidity function is especially pronounced in niche markets and during liquidity crises. 141 By investing in sub-markets that are "less liquid, more complex and hard-tovalue," such as convertible bonds, distressed debt, and credit default swaps markets, hedge funds can complete and deepen financial markets. 142 In fact, the growth and development of some niche markets, such as unsecured and subordinated debt markets, in recent years is attributed to or correlated with the growth of hedge funds that are willing to take risks that other traditional financial firms, such as banks, are not. their true or fundamental values. 146 Moreover, their proprietary investment in information acquisition can significantly increase the hedge funds' role in disciplining underperforming firms 147 and, in some cases, uncovering fraudulent activities. Therefore, the larger the number and size of hedge funds, the more efficient the financial markets become.
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Due to their lighter regulation, it is somewhat easier for hedge funds to take contrarian positions in financial markets. Unlimited use of leverage, short selling, 149 limited investor liquidity (limited redemption rights or longer lockups), unlimited ability to invest in derivatives, and unrestrained investment concentration all enable hedge funds to take positions in financial markets that other financial institutions cannot take because of their regulatory capital requirements. This contrarian function of hedge funds can smooth and reduce market volatility as well as reduce the number and volume of asset price bubbles.
150 Not surprisingly, empirical evidence suggests that hedge fund leverage is countercyclical to the leverage of listed financial intermediaries, meaning that given the pro-cyclicality of leverage in other financial institutions, hedge fund leverage has an inverse relationship to the leverage of other major financial market participants. 151 In other words, when mainstream financial institutions increase their leverage during a financial boom, the hedge fund leverage tends to decrease, whereas in a financial bust or credit crunch, the mainstream financial institutions' leverage decreases, while hedge fund leverage tends to increase. This hedge fund feature, coupled with their unlimited ability to leverage their contrarian positions, amplifies the effects of such positions. As a result, contrarian-position taking by hedge funds can smooth the volatility of financial markets. Indeed, the nature of hedge funds' contra-rian strategies enables them to be active traders during financial crises, which can also potentially form a price floor in distressed markets. Other financial institutions, such as credit institutions, cannot play that role because they are all subject to risk-based capital-adequacy requirements (CARs). 152 Therefore, hedge funds provide a significant stabilizing influence by providing liquidity and spreading risk across a broad range of investors. 153 More importantly, the hedge fund-investor base and the mechanisms hedge funds use to lock-up capital for longer periods allow them to sustain their contrarian positions against market perceptions and movements. 154 Unlike mutual funds and banks, hedge funds are not obliged to redeem an investor's investment on demand or even within a very short period of time. The right to redeem alternative investments is typically governed by private contracts that are likely to impose longer lock-up periods on the investors' capital. In particular, gates and side-pocket arrangements within the purview of private ordering give hedge funds another tool to restrict investor liquidity. Freedom from liquidity constraints gives hedge funds even more tools and techniques to better manage their liquidity risks, enabling them to have long-term horizons in their investment strategies. 155 Relying, in part, on such benefits, it has been argued that, since the emergence of hedge funds as major-market participants, the financial markets have become more resilient in times of market turbulence, such as the technology or dot-com bubble burst, the 2001-2002 recession, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and the shocks caused by corporate scandals. 156 Although the severity of the recent global financial crisis and the collapse of a number of hedge funds generated significant doubts about that claim, evidence suggests that many new hedge funds were launched to take advantage of price dislocations in securitized markets. 157 All in all, hedge funds can substantially contribute to "capital formation, market efficiency, price discovery, and liquidity". 158 Regulatory agencies have consistently acknowledged the benefits of hedge funds to financial system. 159 Even after the financial crisis, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) suggested that hedge funds should be compensated for their intermediary functions and willingness to take those risks that other financial market participants are unwilling (or unable) to take. 160 Not only do the hedge funds' unique functions and benefits make them special in financial systems, thereby requiring special regulatory treatment, but also design-based ex-ante regulation of hedge funds justifies their differentiated regulatory treatment. By design, hedge funds have limits on the number and qualifications of their investor base. For example, investor-base limitations in existing hedge fund regulations rule out any further need for regulation to protect hedge fund investors. The same cannot be said for banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, because investors in those financial institutions are typically unsophisticated.
On the other hand, a hedge fund's choice of organizational form (LLP or LLC) automatically triggers certain mandatory rules relating to, among other things, the general partners' (or managers') co-investment in hedge funds and their potential liability. These features are intended to substantially align the fund manager's incentives with the interests of the hedge fund's investors. If not circumvented, one way or another, that organizational form automatically rules out the need to impose on hedge funds the types of corporate governance standards that are normally required for banks and mutual funds.
To recapitulate, hedge funds provide several benefits to financial markets. They are sources of diversification and liquidity. By investing in "less liquid, more complex and hard-to-value" markets such as convertible bonds, distressed debt, and credit default swaps markets, hedge funds complete and deepen special regulatory treatment of hedge funds can be considered as a compensation package for hedge funds' benefits to the financial system such as liquidity provision in illiquid markets, helping the price discovery mechanism to become more efficient, risk distribution, contribution to financial integration, and diversification benefits.
financial markets. 161 More importantly, their focus on generating alpha is rooted in exploiting market imperfections and discrepancies, 162 which facilitates the price discovery mechanism in financial markets by eroding arbitrage opportunities. 163 In addition, hedge funds are considered contrarian positiontakers in financial markets, 164 and the mechanisms they use to lock-up their capital, such as investors' limited redemption rights, enable them to sustain such contrarian positions. 165 That function alone can potentially decrease market volatility and reduce the number and magnitude of asset price bubbles. 166 Focusing on these functional features of hedge funds, which constitute the definition of hedge funds, can help regulators to identify hedge funds and distinguish them from a variety of similar investment firms. Although there can be no bullet-proof definition of hedge funds that includes all hedge funds but excludes all similar investment funds, this definition, which focuses on essential features and specific functions of the hedge fund industry in the financial market, represents a step forward in the policy responses aimed at regulating hedge funds. It is worth highlighting that, if applied rigidly, this definition, in itself, will not impede regulatory arbitrage and other problems arising out of definitions. However, when combined with a flexible approach within a principles-based regulation framework, this definition may provide helpful guidance to regulators attempting to identify and distinguish hedge funds from similar funds. Using the definition is highly likely to help optimize regulatory efforts by making them pointed and focused to a set of specific funds and, in turn, prevent unintended consequences and potential unintended disruptions in both markets and institutions due to regulatory gaps or overlaps stemming from ill-conceived definitions of hedge funds.
